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ABSTRACT
Manuscript Type: Empirical
Research Question/Issue: This paper investigates the connection between earnings management and corporate social
responsibility (CSR). We argue that earnings management practices damage the collective interests of stakeholders; hence,
managers who manipulate earnings can deal with stakeholder activism and vigilance by resorting to CSR practices.
Research Findings/Insights: Using archival data from a multi-national panel sample of 593 firms from 26 countries between
2002 and 2004, we find a positive impact of earnings management practices on CSR; this relationship holds for different
robustness checks. Also, we demonstrate that the combination of earnings management and CSR has a negative impact on
financial performance.
Theoretical/Academic Implications: This study draws on a generalized agency theory where managers are seen as the
agents of all stakeholders and the earnings management literature to highlight that CSR can be used to garner support from
stakeholders and, therefore, provides an opportunity for entrenchment to those managers that manipulate earnings. As
such, it suggests new avenues of research for both the corporate governance literature, as well as for the stakeholder
perspective.
Practitioner/Policy Implications: This study offers insights for policy makers and managers interested in enhancing CSR.
For managers, our findings suggest that projecting a socially-friendly image in order to disguise earnings management
cannot be sustained over time due to the detrimental effect on financial performance. In addition, this study provides a
warning signal to policy makers that certain practices geared toward raising a firm’s CSR may simply be a mechanism for
hindering other devious practices.
Keywords: Corporate social responsibility, earnings management
INTRODUCTION
A ccounting earnings are one of the most frequently citedperformance statistics that are of major interest to exter-
nal capital providers, suppliers, employees, customers, com-
munities, and regulators. Ideally, financial reporting helps
the better-performing firms to distinguish themselves from
poorperformers and facilitates shareholderfinancial decision
making (Healy and Wahlen, 1999). However, managers can
exercise some discretion in computing earnings without
violating generally accepted accounting principles, thereby
causing reported incomes to appear either greater or less than
they are in reality. In fact, Watts and Zimmerman (1978)
define earnings management as managers exercising their
discretion over the accounting numbers. They further state
that this intervention in the external financial reporting
processmay be intended to eithermislead some stakeholders
about the underlying economic performance of the company
or to influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported
accounting numbers (Healy and Wahlen, 1999: 368).
In the absence of the potential for private benefits, rational
managers would not engage in earnings management. Prior
research on earnings management has identified three
sets of incentives that spur this practice–capital markets,
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contractual arrangements, and regulatory motivations
(Healy and Wahlen, 1999). First, the evidence demonstrates
that managers try to influence short-term prices, particularly
around the time of certain types of corporate events, like
stock issues (DuCharme, Malatesta and Sefcik, 2004). Other
authors, however, have suggested that managers may use
their discretion to manage earnings in order to send private
information to financial markets over future prospects for
the firm. In effect, Ronen and Sadan (1981) developed a
model in which earnings management is aimed at removing
transitory items, allowing investors to better predict the
expected earnings and cash flows. Second, other researchers
have examined lending and compensation contracts, written
in terms of accounting numbers, and have suggested that
these contracts create incentives for earnings management
with a view to boosting bonus awards (e.g., Holthausen,
Larcker and Sloan, 1995), improving job security (e.g.,
DeAngelo, 1988), and mitigating the potential violation of
debt covenants (e.g., DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994). Finally,
there are also regulatory motivations for earnings manage-
ment. Managers of firms in regulated sectors suffer acute
pressure from antitrust authorities regarding price controls
and market shares. Such pressure stimulates earnings man-
agement practices as a stratagem to appear less profitable
(Watts and Zimmerman, 1978). In summary, the earnings
management literature suggests that capital markets, con-
tractual arrangements, and regulatory considerations induce
managers to manipulate earnings reports.
These deliberate managerial actions, contrived to disguise
the real value of a firm’s assets, transactions, or financial
position, have negative consequences for shareholders,
employees, the communities in which firms work, society at
large, and managers’ reputations, job security, and careers
(Zahra, Priem and Rasheed, 2005). One of the most far-
reaching consequences of actions like the manipulation of
earnings is that the firm loses the support of stakeholders,
which may lead to increased activism and vigilance from
shareholders and other affected stakeholder groups (Zahra
et al., 2005: 818). The consequence is that the manager is
under the threat of rogue behavior by employees, misunder-
standing from customers, pressure from investors, defection
from partners, legal action from regulators, boycotts from
activists, illegitimacy from the community, and exposure
from the media. Ultimately, these threats may destroy the
firm’s reputation capital (Fombrun, Gardberg and Barnett,
2000).
As a defence against stakeholder activism and vigi-
lance, which could cost a manager his job and damage the
firm’s reputation, managers have incentives to compensate
stakeholders through corporate social responsibility (CSR)
practices. CSR is related to ethical and moral issues concern-
ing corporate decision-making and behavior and, as such,
addresses complex issues like environmental protection,
human resources management, health and safety at work,
local community relations, and relationships with suppliers
and customers (Castelo and Lima, 2006). Engaging in
socially responsible activities not only improves stakeholder
satisfaction, but also has a positive effect on corporate repu-
tation. Disclosure of information about corporate behavior
and outcomes regarding social responsibility may help
build a positive image among stakeholders (Orlitzky,
Schmidt and Rynes, 2003). This positive image may help
firms to establish community ties and build reputation
capital; hence improving their ability to negotiate more
attractive contracts with suppliers and governments, to
charge premium prices for goods and services, and to
reduce their cost of capital (Fombrun et al., 2000). Therefore,
by resorting to CSR practices, the firm is able to gain support
from its various stakeholder groups. Also, by the same
token, the firm can obtain more favorable regulatory treat-
ment, endorsements from activist groups, legitimacy from
the community, and favorable coverage from the media
(Castelo and Lima, 2006), so as to avoid the potentially det-
rimental impact of government actions.
Our basic conjecture is that an executive who manipu-
lates earnings has an incentive to project a socially-friendly
image, given that CSR activities are a powerful tool for
obtaining support from stakeholders. With this tactic, the
manager will reduce the likelihood of being fired due to
pressure from discontented shareholders or other stake-
holders whose interests have been damaged by the imple-
mentation of earnings management practices. Under such a
scheme, CSR is used as an entrenchment mechanism (Cespa
and Cestone, 2007) in the context of earnings manipulation.
We provide support for our contention using an interna-
tional database, composed of 593 firms from 26 nations,
for the period 2002 to 2004. This result highlights the
perverse effects of combining CSR with earnings manage-
ment, calling into question some social demands on better-
performing firms to devote part of their financial resources
to improve their CSR. Accordingly, if these improvements
are connected with earnings management practices, they
may damage firms’ long-term wealth.
The remainder of the article is structured as follows: the
second section summarizes the most relevant literature
related to the objectives of this work and develops the
hypotheses; and third section is methodological, describing
the sample, variables, and empirical models to be tested; and
the fourth section presents the empirical results obtained.
The final section of the article illustrates the main conclu-
sions of this research and a discussion of the significance of
the results.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
AND HYPOTHESES
Earnings management and CSR
Previous research (e.g., Davidson III, Jiraporn, Kim and
Nemec, 2004) has established a relationship between earn-
ings management and agency theory. These studies adopt, as
their starting point, the traditional view that the separation
of ownership and control in modern corporations, together
with the existence of information asymmetries within firms,
spawn the possibility of opportunistic actions by the agent
(the manager) who may have different objectives from those
of the principal (the owner), and thus pursue self-serving
goals (the agency problem). In this context, earnings man-
agement is considered a type of agency cost because man-
agers look after their own interests by releasing financial
reports that do not present an accurate economic picture of
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the firm. As a consequence, shareholders could make non-
optimal investment decisions (agency cost). Therefore, earn-
ings management is related to agency theory because the
former can create or exacerbate agency costs.
However, earnings management not only affects a firm’s
owners, it also has an impact on other stakeholders, too.
Stakeholders are considered a group that “bear some form
of risk as a result of having invested some form of capital,
human or financial, something of value, in a firm” (Clarkson,
1994: 5). This definition means that managerial actions like
earnings management that mislead stakeholders as to the
real value of firm’s assets, transactions, or financial posi-
tion, have serious consequences for shareholders, creditors,
employees, and society as a whole (Zahra et al., 2005).
When shareholders suspect earnings are being manipu-
lated, a firm immediately loses value on the stock market
(Dechow and Sweeney, 1996). Predictably, this firm’s credit
rating will then fall causing any bonds issued to lose value,
which affects bondholders’ wealth. Similarly, banks may
have lent money based on inflated income forecasts, thus
making the recovery of loans problematic (DeFond and
Jiambalvo, 1994). The employees are another stakeholder
group affected by earnings management practices. D’Souza,
Jacob and Ramesh (2000) studied the association between
earnings management and labor costs and found that man-
agers reduce reported earnings during labor union contract
negotiations, in order to reduce labor costs. Finally, any
reporting of numbers that do not reflect the true economic
condition of a firm can also lead to a general lack of faith in
the integrity of managers, and lead to the erosion in confi-
dence in markets and the institutions, which in turn could
have serious consequences for society as a whole (Zahra
et al., 2005).
As managerial decisions directly impact all stakeholders
groups, the manager can be viewed as the stakeholders’
agent, and not just a shareholders’ agent (Hill and Jones,
1992; Jones, 1995). Adopting this stakeholder-agency per-
spective, a firm is conceived not as a bilateral relationship
between shareholders and managers, but as a multilateral
set of relationships amongst stakeholders. Each stakeholder
has, in turn, their own interests, which generally are in con-
flict with those of the other stakeholders’. Certainly, one of
the most important conflicts of interest occurs between
managers and all other stakeholders, an amplified agency
problem (Hill and Jones, 1992), which sometimes prevents
stakeholders from maximizing their collective utility.
Because managers control the decision-making process in
the firm, they may use this power to their own benefit,
thereby causing significant losses to the rest of the stake-
holders.
A primary response from stakeholders to such a manifes-
tation of management power may be to punish management
in an attempt to change this opportunistic behavior (Rowley
and Berman, 2000). Boycotts and lobbying are some of the
examples of these actions (Baron, 2001; Feddersen and
Gilligan, 2001; John and Klein, 2003). By wielding the threat
of costly boycotts and media campaigns, stakeholders may
enjoy substantial, although indirect, control over a firm.
Complementary measures that may hinder managerial dis-
cretion are: employee unionization and activism, loss of con-
fidence from customers, legal action from regulators, and
the threat of defection from business partners (Castelo and
Lima, 2006). In this context, the media can amplify the effect
of such actions, thus, contributing to the reduction in man-
agement abuse.
Several studies have shown that the media has been
particularly influential in corporate socially responsible
responses (e.g., Bansal, 2005). The increased media coverage
raises the firm’s visibility, causing public attention and scru-
tiny to be more severe. The threat of negative media public-
ity has two consequences for managerial practices (Bansal,
2005: 203). First, such publicity generates coercive pressure
for firms to commit to sustainable development; threatening
to erode the image of a firm that implements practices that
the media considers unacceptable (e.g., Starbucks and its
relationship with African coffee suppliers). Second, it can
incite stakeholders to lobby organizations and governments
in order to change business practices (e.g., the climate
change lobby). In the specific case related to earnings
management, some stakeholders have articulated specific
responses. For example, shareholders and other stakehold-
ers proactively seek reparations for the losses they have suf-
fered (Zahra et al., 2005). Further, some companies are
starting to develop in-house whistle-blowing programs in
which employees can disclose concerns about accounting
and operational issues discreetly and anonymously.
In such a context, managers with capital markets, contrac-
tual, or regulatory motivations to manage earnings, may
work to bolster their own job security by entrenching them-
selves and staying on in the job even if they are no longer
competent or qualified to run the firm. A possible means of
protecting their job (and maintaining private benefits) is by
engaging in a broad array of activities that are aimed at
developing relationships with corporate stakeholders and
environmental activists, so-called CSR, so as to gain support
from these groups. CSR includes activities such as incorpo-
rating social aspects into products and manufacturing pro-
cesses, adopting progressive human resources practices,
achieving improved environmentally-friendly ratings
through recycling and pollution abatement, or by advancing
the goals of community organizations (McWilliams, Siegel
and Wright, 2006).
By means of CSR activities, the manager pursues different
objectives to obtain favorable coverage from the media,
legitimacy from the community, favorable regulation, and
less scrutiny from investors and employees. At the same
time, such activity can reduce the likelihood of a firm’s
products being boycotted, while avoiding lobbying against
the company. In essence, a manager believes that by satisfy-
ing stakeholders’ interests and projecting an image of social
and environmental concern and awareness, he can reduce
the likelihood of being scrutinized by satisfied stakeholders
for his management of earnings.
Such abusive utilization of CSR activities brings into
doubt the efficiency of implementing socially-friendly poli-
cies as a corporate governance mechanism. This view differs
from that provided by traditional stakeholder theory by sug-
gesting that stakeholder participation can be an important
way for management to do the following: (1) reinforce the
firm’s perceived social legitimacy; (2) increase the involve-
ment of the board of directors; and (3) hold top management
to a higher standard of performance. All these factors serve
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to enhance financial performance (Luoma and Goodstein,
1999). However, our proposal is consistent with some
prominent finance scholars who have questioned the posi-
tive effect of stakeholder orientation on corporate gover-
nance. Notably, Williamson (1993), Tirole (2001), and Jensen
(2001) argue that agency problems between owners and
managers are aggravated when managers act on behalf of
non-shareholder stakeholders, especially since stakeholder
orientation implies participation by different groups of con-
stituencies in the decision-making process, as well as a mul-
tiplicity of objectives of those who share corporate control.
This problem will add significant costs to the decision-
making process (e.g., delayed decisions, mutual distrust;
Tirole, 2001). Therefore, control concentrated in the hands of
just one stakeholder (i.e., shareholders) is preferable to that
distributed among different stakeholders.
A second argument that justifies the non-sincere use of
CSR by managers who manipulate earnings is connected to
the implementation of entrenchment initiatives. From this
viewpoint, concessions to social activists and pressure
groups are simple self-entrenchment strategies for incum-
bent CEOs who face pressure from shareholders whose
interests will be damaged, in the medium-term, as a result
of earnings management practices. Pagano and Volpin
(2005) argue that managers may reward stakeholders such
as workers with generous social activities as an entrench-
ment mechanism to avoid possible pressure from financial
markets through hostile takeovers. Hence, we hypothesize
that, when managers act in pursuit of private benefits by
misleading others about the real value of the firm’s assets,
transactions, or financial position, they may seek the con-
nivance of different stakeholders to validate such practices.
Stakeholders can be lured by offers that satisfy their spe-
cific interests and policies aimed at improving a firm’s
CSR.
Therefore, we expect that executives with incentives to
manage earnings will be very proactive in boosting their
public exposure through CSR activities, particularly in firms
with high visibility (i.e., in regulated sectors). Alternatively,
firms with low levels of earnings management have fewer
incentives to seek public exposure by promoting socially
responsible activities. These arguments lead to the following
hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: The extent of earnings management is positively
associated with the extent of corporate social responsibility.
Corporate Social Responsibility and Performance:
The Moderating Role of Earnings Management
The second aspect that we address in this article refers to the
impact of CSR activities on financial performance, triggered
by earnings management practices. The instrumental stake-
holder theory (Donaldson and Preston, 1995) argues that
good management implies positive relationships with key
stakeholders, which, in turn, improve financial performance
(Freeman, 1984; Waddock and Graves, 1997). The basic
assumption behind this theory is that CSR may be an orga-
nizational device that leads to more effective use of
resources (Orlitzky et al., 2003), which then has a positive
impact on corporate financial performance (CFP). Hence, the
strategic management of stakeholder relationships – an
intangible asset – can be viewed as a means of improving
financial performance by invoking the resource-based
theory of the firm (Hillman and Keim, 2001). Berman, Wicks,
Kotha and Jones (1999) also find support for the position
that good stakeholder relationships have a direct positive
effect on financial performance, a notion sometimes called
the “Good Management Hypothesis” (Waddock and Graves,
1997).
The positive impact of CSR on CFP, however, has been
questioned by various arguments. First, a short-sighted
argument that managers, especially those recently-
appointed and trying to acquire greater seniority, tend to
pursue short-term policies that focus exclusively on financial
results at the expense of long-term social issues (Preston and
O’Bannon, 1997). Second, the management of relationships
among a wide set of stakeholders with conflicting objectives
can result in an excessively rigid and resource-consuming
organization that may damage a firm’s financial perfor-
mance (Aupperle, Carroll and Hatfield, 1985). Finally,
managers may behave opportunistically, to the detriment
of financial results, by following entrenchment practices
(Jones, 1995) aimed at satisfying stakeholders’ interests, as
we have detailed in the previous section.
Along this line, we argue that when firms improve their
CSR as a consequence of earnings management practices,
the positive effect of CSR on CFP should be diminished
significantly. This statement relies on the fact that managers
who resort to accounting adjustments tend to over-invest in
those activities that enhance a firm’s CSR as an entrench-
ment strategy. Social concessions emerging from this strat-
egy are unproductive and, because they are costly, are
expected to have a marginal negative impact on financial
performance. For example, a manager may over-invest in
ongoing, complex projects by employing different stake-
holders to satisfy their interests and, at the same time,
manage earnings in order to give these stakeholders large
concessions. Rowley (1997) emphasizes that high levels of
CSR may involve relationships with a wide set of stake-
holders with conflicting objectives that could delay the
decision-taking process in the organization.
We hypothesize that a manager who engages in earnings
management practices would attempt to involve as many
stakeholders as possible, as a way to validate their actions
and, hence, become indispensable (entrenchment strategy).
This action leads to a reduction in the flexibility in the orga-
nization and affects its financial results detrimentally. Addi-
tionally, some authors remain skeptical about the supposed
positive externalities caused by CSR. Friedman (1970) and
Jensen (2001) argue that socially responsible initiatives are
investments without payoffs and, therefore, against the
shareholder’s best interest.
The preceding discussion suggests that the level of earn-
ings manipulation weakness the relationship between CSR
and profitability. Hence, our second hypothesis reads:
Hypothesis 2: Earnings management will negatively moderate
the relationship between corporate social responsibility and
corporate financial performance; the greater the level of earn-
ings management, the lesser the positive effect of corporate
social responsibility on corporate financial performance.
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EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
Sample and Data
Our sample is composed of 593 industrial firms included
in the 2002-2004 SiRi ProTM database. This database is com-
piled by the Sustainable Investment Research International
Company (SiRi) – the world’s largest company specializing
in the analysis of socially responsible investment, and based
in Europe, North America, and Australia. SiRi comprises
eleven independent research institutions, such as KLD
Research & Analytics, Inc., in the USA and Centre Info SA in
Switzerland, and provides detailed profiles of the leading
international corporations. Companies are analyzed accord-
ing to their reporting procedures, policies and guidelines,
management systems, and key data. This information is
extracted from financial accounts, company documentation,
international databases, media reports, interviews with key
stakeholders, and ongoing contact with management repre-
sentatives. The profile of each firm contains over 350 data
points that cover all major stakeholder issues such as com-
munity involvement, environmental impact, customer poli-
cies, employment relations, human rights issues, activities in
controversial areas (e.g., alcohol), supplier relations, and
corporate governance.
We complement these data on corporate responsibility
with financial data from the COMPUSTAT Global Vantage
database for the year 2000 through 2005. The COMPUSTAT
Global Vantage database contains balance sheets, income
statements, cash flow statements, and stock data, all of which
have been standardized to accommodate the wide variety of
financial accounting practices across countries and indus-
tries. The final sample is an incomplete panel data of 593
companies from 26 countries. In our sample, information
on social issues is available across all three years under
analysis (2002 through 2004) for 356 firms from 17 different
countries.
Measures
Earnings Management. There are several ways to measure
earnings management. Recent empirical studies in account-
ing and finance have used the approach that divides current
accruals into their discretionary and nondiscretionary com-
ponents. Following Jones (1991) and Dechow, Sloan and
Sweeney (1995), we define current accruals as:
Accruals CA Cash
CL STD DEP
= −( )
− −( ) −
Δ Δ
Δ Δ [1]
Where DCA is the change in current assents; DCash is the
change in cash; DCL is the change in current liabilities; DSTD
is the change in debt included in current liabilities; and DEP
is the depreciation and amortization.
Thereafter, we compute the expected accruals using
an explanatory model (see Appendix 1 for details). The dif-
ferences between accruals and expected accruals are the
unexplained or discretionary accruals (DA); this difference is
a proxy for management discretion on reported earnings
(Earnings_management). In particular, we adopt Kothari,
Leone and Wasley (2005) in order to extract the effect of
performance on computing the DA.1 The use of such an
accrual measure enhances the reliability of inferences from
earnings management studies with respect to DA, as stan-
dard models (Jones and modified-Jones models) might be
ill-specified because performance and estimated DA exhibit
a mechanical relationship. Such an adjustment for perfor-
mance eliminates, therefore, the criticism that is made in the
earnings management literature, that DA differences rely on
differences in performance.
Finally, in order to test the robustness of our results, in
some specifications we have used a different variable to
detect earnings manipulation. In particular, we study earn-
ings management by focussing on the practice of income
smoothing (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1995; Yeo, Tan, Ho and
Chen, 2002). Managers smooth earnings, as part of an
entrenchment strategy, in order to ensure the stability of
cash-flow streams so that they can satisfy the short-
term interests of shareholders. The variable used (Income_
smoothing), is defined as the correlation between changes in
accruals and changes in cash flow within a four-year
window.As the number of years in our sample is limited, we
compute this variable using all available years from the
COMPUSTAT Global Vantage database (1995-2004).
Corporate Social Responsibility. CSR was notoriously dif-
ficult to operationalize in the past (Waddock and Graves,
1997), because it is a multidimensional construct (Carroll,
1979) that should capture a wide range of items; ideally, one
for each relevant stakeholder (Waddock and Graves, 1997).
We use SiRi ProTM data, which includes eight research fields.
The first one provides a general overview of a company and
the last field reports the level of involvement in so-called
controversial business activities. The remaining sections are
devoted to measuring the extent of a firm’s responsibilities
to its stakeholders: community, corporate governance
(shareholders), customers, employees, environment, and
vendors and contractors.
In Table 1, we show the items that are used to compute the
score for a particular type of stakeholder, the workers.
Similar items are used to compute the score for other stake-
holders.2 The scores for each item are rated by the SiRi ana-
lysts on scales ranging from zero (worst) to 100 (best) by
taking into consideration four criteria–transparency, prin-
ciples, management, and operations. Importantly, each infor-
mation item is weighted according to a methodology which
is sector-specific, developed by SiRi. For each sector, SiRi’s
analysts determine the firm’s potential negative impact on
each stakeholder item and assign weightings in proportion.
Firms in the same sector are subjected to the same weighting
scheme. Firms in other sectors use different schemes. For
example, for energy companies, the items related to “envi-
ronment” are assigned a heavier weighting than for compa-
nies in the financial services industry.
The final score provided by SiRi is the weighted sum of
each of the scores by its corresponding weight. In this study,
we use that score and we detract the component that
corresponds to shareholders. We do not consider such stake-
holders in order to preclude the existence of endogeneity
problems between our proxy of CSR and some explanatory
variables that are closely connected to a firm’s financial per-
formance.
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In order to test the moderating effect of earnings manage-
ment on the relationship between CSR and financial perfor-
mance (Hypothesis 2), in some specifications, we define the
multiplicative variable DEarnings_management*CSR, where
DEarnings_management that is equal to 1 when Earnings_
management is larger than the mean for the corresponding
sector year and country.
Corporate Financial Performance. We use return on assets
(ROA), which is the ratio of earnings before interests and
TABLE 1
Description of the Items for Computing the Score of Employees’ Satisfaction (Nestle)a
Items (i) Score Weight Weighted score Weight Weighted score
Sij Wij Sij ¥ Wij
W
W
ij
ij
i∑
W
W
Sij
ij
i
ij∑ ×
D Separate employee report 100 0.01 1.02 0.06 6.00
D Employee information on website 100 0 0.34 0.02 2.00
D Employee information in annual report 100 0.01 1.02 0.06 6.00
D Policies/Principles regarding employees 100 0 0.34 0.02 2.00
D Description of employee benefits programmes 100 0 0.34 0.02 2.00
D Disclosure of quantitative data 70 0 0.24 0.02 1.40
P Formal policy statement on health and safety 80 0.01 0.54 0.04 3.20
P Formal policy on diversity/employment equity 80 0.01 0.54 0.04 3.20
P Formal policy on freedom of association 80 0.01 0.54 0.04 3.20
P Formal policy statement on child/forced labor 100 0 0.34 0.02 2.00
P Formal policy statement on working hours 80 0.01 0.54 0.04 3.20
P Formal policy statement on wages 80 0 0.27 0.02 1.60
M Board responsibility for human resources issues 100 0.01 0.51 0.03 3.00
M Specific health and safety targets 30 0.01 0.16 0.03 0.92
M Diversity/Equal opportunity programs 40 0.01 0.20 0.03 1.20
M Work/Life programs 40 0.01 0.20 0.03 1.20
M Training programs 80 0.01 0.41 0.03 2.40
M Participative management programs 40 0.01 0.20 0.03 1.20
M Systems for collective labor negotiations 40 0.01 0.20 0.03 1.20
M Cash profit sharing programs 0 0 0 0.02 0
M Ownership programs 40 0 0.10 0.02 0.59
M Regular employee satisfaction surveys 80 0.01 0.41 0.03 2.40
M Specific employment related indicators 80 0.01 0.41 0.03 2.40
C Total workplace time lost 30 0 0.07 0.01 0.41
C Health and safety fines 50 0 0.12 0.01 0.68
C Employee satisfaction 40 0.01 0.21 0.03 1.22
C Supervisory Board (NEDs) 80 0 0.18 0.01 1.08
C Management (EDs) 0 0 0 0.01 0
C Quality of industrial relations 60 0.01 0.27 0.03 1.59
C Subsidiaries with social certification 0 0.01 0 0.03 0.00
C Major recent lay-offs 50 0.01 0.23 0.03 1.32
C Health and safety incidents 50 0.01 0.23 0.03 1.32
C Freedom of association 50 0.01 0.23 0.03 1.32
C Discrimination 50 0.01 0.23 0.03 1.32
C Child/Forced Labor 100 0 0 0 0
C Restructuring 30 0.01 0.14 0.03 0.79
C Employment conditions 0 0.01 0 0.03 0
EMPLOYEES SCORE 63.37
SiRi_total_score = SijSij ¥ Wij 71.43
aD stands for “Disclosure”; P stands for “Policies and principles”; M stands for “Management procedures,” and C stands for “Contro-
versies within the relationship with each stakeholder.”
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taxes to the total values of assets. We rely on accounting
measures because they are more sensitive to managers’
manipulations than market measures. As pointed out by
Orlitzky et al. (2003: 408), “indicators such as ROA and ROE
are subject to managers’ discretionary allocations of funds to
different projects and policy choices, and thus reflect
internal decision-making capabilities and managerial per-
formance rather than external market responses to organi-
zational actions.”
This variable is used as a dependent one to test Hypothesis
2 and as an explanatory one to test the robustness of Hypoth-
esis 1. In the latter case, we want to ensure that earnings
management practices still have a positive influence on CSR
after we detract the effect of a firm’s financial performance.
We are particularly interested in analyzing the link between
earnings management and CSR, net of the effect of CFP,
because it may well be the case that earnings management
determines financial performance and the latter, in turn,
affects CSR.3 Under this scheme, the effect of earnings man-
agement on CSR would vanish once we incorporate in our
estimations afinancial performance variable. Thus, according
to this view, entrenchment does not take place and CSR is
simply the consequence of increases in short-term financial
performance due to earnings management.
Control Variables. In order to investigate whether there
is an entrenchment motive that justifies the connection
between earnings management and socially responsible
behavior, in some specifications we define a dummy variable
for entrenchment (Dentrenchment). In doing so, we follow
the specification shown in De Miguel, Pindado and De la
Torre (2004) and estimate a variable for performance (ROA)
in terms of managerial ownership; both quadratic and cubic
terms. As controls, we incorporate size, leverage and invest-
ment, as defined below. The results show that the relation-
ship between performance and managerial ownership
decreases in the range between 21 per cent and 81 per cent.
Hence, we define the aforementioned dummy (Dentrench-
ment) as equal to 1 when managerial ownership is between
21 per cent and 81 per cent and zero otherwise. When the
managerial stake lies between these two numbers, a
manager has sufficient power to trigger entrenchment ini-
tiatives without having to bear 100 per cent of the corre-
sponding costs. Also, we cross this variable with the
aforementioned that characterizes earnings management
(Dentrenchment*Earnings_management) in order to investi-
gate whether the effect of earnings management on the defi-
nition of a firm’s CSR is more pronounced in those situations
when managers are set on entrenchment.
Also, it is important to eliminate the different sources of
spurious correlation described in the literature. First, intan-
gible resources generated by R&D investments make a
firm’s technology more flexible, thereby allowing the
incorporation of customer preferences into the design of
goods produced. This resource improves customer satisfac-
tion and, consequently, the firm’s CSR. At the same time,
several studies show that R&D investments favor the man-
agement of earnings to achieve certain goals (Baber,
Fairfield and Haggard, 1991; Clinch, 1991; Dechow and
Sloan, 1991). Thus, we introduce as a control, R&D_
intensity, which is the ratio of R&D expenditures to total
revenues. Second, an alternative channel that connects
earnings management with CSR is ownership structure.
Companies owned by large blockholders have both larger
levels of CSR and a higher likelihood of managing earn-
ings. For example, Carlson and Bathala (1997) show that
earnings management practices are present particularly in
those firms with institutional ownership. Concomitantly,
Neubaum and Zahra (2006) find that long-term institu-
tional owners, who tend to be controlling blockholders,
affect positively a firm’s CSR. Hence, we propose two vari-
ables of ownership in order to eliminate a possible spuri-
ous correlation due to ownership structure. The variable
Ownership_concentration is the sum of the stakes of the
three largest blockholders. We complement this variable
with another that captures the presence of institutional
blockholders (Institutional_ownership), which is the stake in
the hands of financial institutions.
The final path that may explain the connection between
earnings management and CSR is managerial risk prefer-
ences. Managers who are risk averse tend to have smooth
earnings. Also, these managers tend to collude with other
stakeholders (satisfying their interests) or collude with other
firms (Spagnolo, 2005) as a way of diminishing the overall
volatility of a firm’s structural parameters. In our study, the
managers’ risk profile is studied indirectly through a vari-
able of a firm’s risk, given that managerial risk attitudes are
translated into specific policies that determine the firm’s
overall Risk exposure. As a measure of risk we use the betas
as reported in COMPUSTAT Global Vantage (e.g., Hillman
and Keim, 2001).
The remaining controls are standard for the literature
that studies the connection between variables of financial
performance and social performance (Waddock and
Graves, 1997; Hillman and Keim, 2001): Size is approxi-
mated using total revenues on a log scale in order to
reduce skewness. This variable is widely recognized as a
determinant of a firm’s financial and social responsibility.
For financial structure, we use two variables: Leverage
which is the ratio of total debt to the total value of assets;
and Financial_resources, which is calculated as the ratio of
cash-flow to total assets.
Methodology
We test our hypotheses making use of two basic
specifications–one explains CSR and the other explains CFP.
The main independent variable in both cases is the earnings
management variable. In both specifications, we consider
the same set of control variables in explaining financial per-
formance as well as social responsibility although different
independent non-control variables. In particular, in order to
explain CSR and test Hypothesis 1, we rely on the following
regression:
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Hypothesis 1 is supported when l2 is positive and signifi-
cant. Additionally, in some specifications we add the
Dentrenchment*Earnings_management as well as the Den-
trenchment variable, defined before, in order to test the mar-
ginal effect of earnings management on CSR in a managerial
entrenchment situation. According to our theoretical frame-
work, we would expect a positive sign for the coefficient of
such a variable.
The second specification is aimed at explaining financial
performance. As mentioned before, we employ the same
control variables as in specification [2] and the earnings
management variable. Additionally, in accordance with the
instrumental stakeholder theory, CSR is treated as a predic-
tor variable. Finally, in order to identify whether or not DA
moderate the connection between CSR and financial perfor-
mance, we use the aforementioned inter-action variable
(DEarnings_management*CSR). Hence, the specification is as
follows:
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Hypothesis 2 is supported when the coefficient of the inter-
action term b4 is negative and significant.
In both specifications [2] and [3], we use fixed-effect esti-
mations in order to prevent endogeneity problems, relying
on the eventual correlation between the fixed unobservable
component of the error term and some explanatory vari-
ables. In particular, we expect the unobserved determinants
of CSR, like a firm’s organization, to be perfectly correlated
with a firm’s CFP. Thus, we have to estimate in differences
(fixed-effect estimation).4 Additionally, we lag some inde-
pendent variables by one period to prevent endogeneity
problems that are not linked to the constant unobservable
heterogeneity. In particular, we lag the variable CFP by one
period when estimating CSR (see equation [2]) because
instrumental stakeholder theory establishes that the latter
variable is a determinant of CFP. Regarding the specification
of CFP (see equation [3]) we lag the variable for CSR because,
as mentioned in the theoretical section, readily available
financial resources may affect a firm’s CSR – Slack Resources
Hypothesis (Waddock and Graves, 1997). Also, in speci-
fication [3] we lag the variable for Discretionary Accruals, as
well as the interaction term (DEarnings_management*CSR)
because bad financial results may trigger earnings manipu-
lations. Finally, in both specifications we lag two control
variables: Leverage and Risk, because debt capacity (closely
related to risk), as well as overall firm risk are determined by
a firm’s financial and social results.
RESULTS
Table 2A reports means, standard deviations, and minimum
andmaximumvalues. Thedescriptive analysis shows that the
CSR variable shows a mean value of 47.44 per cent on a scale
between zero and 100. Among the countries with the largest
scores are: Luxembourg (72.64 per cent); Taiwan (62.09 per
cent); Finland (60.52 per cent); Denmark (58.84 per cent);
Norway (57.91 per cent); Canada (56.58 per cent); Austria
(56.23 per cent) and UK (55.63 per cent). The worst perform-
ers areMexico (27.95 per cent); Singapore (27.08 per cent) and
Greece (26.64 per cent), with the US (45.18 per cent) slightly
below the mean.5 By sector, the highest ratings (54.14 per
cent) correspond to those with a one-digit SIC equal to 1
(metal mining, oil & gas field exploration services, and
TABLE 2A
Descriptive Statistics
Variable Number of
Observations
Mean
Value
Standard
Deviation
Minimum
Value
Maximum
Value
CSR 1,105 47.44 15.00 0.78 80.14
ROA 1,105 4.57 8.86 -114.60 28.14
Earnings_management 1,105 -0.01 0.14 -1.90 1.48
DEarnings_management*CSR 1,105 -1.70 5.20 -26.59 23.39
Dentrenchment 1,105 0.01 0.11 0.00 1.00
Dentrenchment*Earnings_management 1,105 0.00 0.02 -0.41 0.11
Income_smoothing 873 0.10 0.61 -0.99 1.00
R&D_intensity 1,105 41.19 113.08 0.00 896.69
Ownership_concentration 1,105 15.29 6.95 3.13 100
Institutional_ownership 1,105 2.57 6.10 0.00 89.65
Risk 1,105 1.05 0.76 -0.44 5.16
Size 1,105 18,403.81 32,582.88 40.10 30,3756
Leverage 1,105 24.12 15.67 0.00 91.46
Financial_resources 1,105 0.59 0.46 0.07 5.01
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general building contractors) and the worst (37.34 per cent)
correspond to thosewith a one-digit SIC equal to seven (hotel
services, recreation services). Within the regulated sectors,
water supply, and gas return score much higher than the
mean (57.58 per cent), while the score for the telecommuni-
cations sector is closer to the mean (48.32 per cent). Also,
when we turn our attention to the Earnings_management vari-
able, we find that DA are larger (0.01) than the overall mean
(-0.01), in regulated sectors (water, gas, and electric services
-2-digit SIC code = 49). In the following analysis, we show
that the connection between earnings management and CSR
is more significant in regulated sectors.
The analysis of the correlation matrix (see Table 2B) shows
that variations in earnings management show a positive cor-
relation with variations in CSR (r = .12, p < .05).6 This positive
result is also true for the variable that crosses earnings
management with entrenchment (Dentrenchment*Earnings_
management), which indicates that variations in earnings
management practices, in a situation of eventual entrench-
ment, is positively correlated with variations in CSR. This
correlation conforms to Hypothesis 1. Also in Table 2B, we
observe that variations in DA are positively correlated to
variations in financial performance (r = .07, p < .05). This
result is consistent with the idea that managers manipulate
earnings in order to boost profits. Finally, we also find a
positive correlation between variations in CSR and varia-
tions in CFP (r = .05, n.s.). Remarkably, this correlation
becomes negative (r = -.09, p < .05) when the degree of earn-
ings management is high (DEarnings_management = 1). This
finding is in line with Hypothesis 2.
The analysis of specifications [2] is performed in Table 3A,
while some robustness checks are conducted in Tables 3B
and 3C respectively. More specifically, in Table 3A, we test
the effect of a firm’s earnings management practices on CSR
(Hypothesis 1). Also, we study the significance of this effect
by incorporating CFP as an additional predictor for DA
(column 3). In column 1 we test the direct effect of DA on
CSR. Results indicate that the effect of earnings management
practices on social responsibility is positive and significant
(t = 2.37, p < .01), thus providing support for Hypothesis 1.
Also, in column 2 we investigate whether this effect is
greater in a situation where we expect managerial entrench-
ment. We find that this is the case when the coefficient of
Dentrenchment*Earnings_management is positive (b = 0.68
with t = 1.96, p < .05). Hence, earnings management appears
to lead to improvements in CSR as a managerial device to
avoid stakeholder pressure. Given that such accounting
manipulations may not only damage stakeholders’ interests
but those of shareholders as well, a manager may satisfy
stakeholders’ interests as an entrenchment mechanism in
order to develop alliances with stakeholders as a defence
against restive shareholders. This entrenchment motive that
spurs improvements in a firm’s CSR is supported in our
analysis. Finally, we provide supporting evidence of these
results by introducing a variable for financial performance
(column 3). The inclusion of such a variable is intended to
obviate the possibility of establishing a spurious connection
between earnings management and CSR through a firm’s
financial performance. Concerning the rest of variables,
as expected, we find that CSR is positively related to size
and risk.
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In column 4, we investigate whether a manager starts to
increase CSR one period in advance, in anticipation of earn-
ings management. To do so, we consider the mean value of
CSR, between period t and t-1, as a dependent variable. The
result, although less significant, also holds for this specifica-
tion. Although there is a case for the anticipation argument,
it is not very significant.
In Table 3B, we investigate the robustness of our results
when we compare regulated (water, gas, electric services,
and telecommunications) versus non-regulated sectors
(columns 1 and 2). The results show that the positive impact
of earnings management on CSR is more significant in regu-
lated sectors. This result is consistent with the idea that these
are politically sensitive sectors where stakeholder power is
particularly high. Finally, in Columns 3 and 4, we compare
Anglo-Saxon versus non-Anglo-Saxon countries.7 We find
that the effect is more important in Anglo-Saxon countries,
which can be explained by more vigorous stakeholders’
activism in such countries.
In Table 3C, we extend our robustness analysis and focus
on a particular type of earnings manipulation, income
smoothing. Columns 1 and 2 show that this variable has
a positive impact on CSR when we take into account the
specification for the variable for DA (Earnings_management
in column 2). Finally, in Columns 3 and 4, we limit our
analysis to two particular types of stakeholders, customers
and employees. We choose these two types of stakeholders
because they are among the most salient. The results are
robust for these stakeholders, too. Remarkably, in an unre-
ported estimation, when we focus on other stakeholders that
TABLE 3A
Estimation of CSR on Financial Performanceand Discretionary Accrualsa
Table 3A shows the results of estimating CSR in terms of earnings management and other control variables defined in the
text. In column 4 the dependent variable is the average value of CSR between period t and t-1.
Dependent Variable CSR CSR CSR Average CSR
CFP (t-1) .07† .05
(1.72) (1.52)
Earnings_management .84** .70* .69* .49†
(2.37) (1.87) (1.93) (1.72)
Dentrenchment*Earnings_management .68* .68* .44†
(1.96) (1.99) (1.60)
Dentrenchment 5.29 4.97 4.94†
(1.46) (1.39) (1.71)
R&D_intensity 1.19 1.28 1.18 1.08
(1.17) (1.25) (1.16) (1.32)
Ownership_concentration -.14 -.19 -.16 -.28
(-.47) (-.66) (-.56) (-1.22)
Institutional_ownership .07 .08 .07 .07
(1.29) (1.32) (1.29) (1.53)
Risk (t-1) .94 1.16† 1.10† 1.00*
(1.48) (1.75) (1.72) (1.96)
Size 4.67** 4.49** 4.51** 4.37**
(2.76) (2.61) (2.67) (3.22)
Leverage (t-1) .34 .30 .65 .36
(.35) (.31) (.65) (.44)
Financial_resources -2.44 -1.56 -11.58 -5.55
(-.22) (-.14) (-.96) (-.57)
Constant -.92* -.64 -1.42** -1.14**
(-2.29) (-1.14) (-2.94) (-2.94)
Number of observations 1105 1105 1105 1105
R2 4.46% 4.52% 4.96% 3.97%
Fitness Test 2.11* 1.87* 2.21** 2.56**
Hausman Test 14.79** 23.54** 19.01* 25.53**
aStandardized regression coefficients are shown in the table. T-statistics in parentheses.
†p < .10
*p < .05
**p < .01
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have less power (e.g., suppliers, the community), the results
do not hold. This behavior conforms to the scenario where a
manager, who has manipulated earnings, seeks to reinforce
relationships with the most important stakeholders.
The results from the estimation of specification [3], to con-
trast Hypothesis 2, are presented in Table 4. We use the
aforementioned variable (DEarnings_management*CSR) to
test the moderating role of DA in the relationship between
CSR and financial performance. Using that variable, we
focus on the moderating role when the degree of earnings
management is high enough. In line with our theory, we
expect that the coefficient of such variable to be negative;
suggesting that generous social concessions, defrayed
through accounting manipulation, reduces the positive
effect of CSR on financial performance.
The results in Column 3 of Table 4 show that the coeffi-
cient for CSR is positive (b = 0.05 with t = 2.76, p < .01)
whereas for the interaction term it is negative (b = -0.04 with
t = -3.34, p < .01). Remarkably, the total effect of CSR on
CFP is still positive (0.05 - 0.04 = 0.01). These results provide
support for Hypothesis 2 concerning the negative moderat-
ing effect of earnings management practices in the relation-
ship between CSR and CFP. It is remarkable that the direct
effect of the earnings management variable is positive in
the contemporaneous specification (b = 0.46 with t = 3.17,
p < .01; in column 1), given that earnings management prac-
tices are aimed at improving financial performance.
However, when we lag this variable by one period (Column
2), we find that these practices have a negative impact on
financial performance. This finding suggests that earnings
TABLE 3B
Robustness Tests for Regulatory & Anglo-Saxon Effectsa
Table 3B shows the results of estimating CSR in terms of earnings management and other control variables defined in the
text. In column 1, we focus on regulated sectors (water supply, gas supply, electric services, and telecommunication), while
in column 2 the results are from the remaining gsectors. Column 3 focuses on Anglo-Saxon countries as defined in La Porta
et al. (1998) (e.g. Australia, Canada, Hong Kong, Ireland, Singapore, Thailand, UK and the US). Finally in column 4, we focus
on non-Anglo-Saxon countries (French, German, Scandinavian-legal origin countries).
Dependent variable CSR CSR CSR CSR
Regulated
Sectors
Non-regulated
Sectors
Anglo-Saxon
Countries
Non-Anglo
Countries
CFP (t-1) .02* .00 .01† .01
(2.10) (1.31) (1.65) (1.29)
Earnings_management .17* .14 .07** -.00
(1.89) (1.12) (2.50) (-.05)
R&D_intensity -1.37 .12† -.03 .11**
(-.41) (1.62) (-.19) (2.61)
Ownership_concentration .14* -.03 -.00 -.01
(2.08) (-1.25) (-.04) (-.27)
Institutional_ownership .03** .02** .01 .01*
(2.37) (4.90) (.92) (1.85)
Risk (t-1)) .24** .24** .11* .02
(2.35) (4.62) (2.24) (.32)
Size 1.24** .49** .28** .52**
(2.72) (3.81) (2.36) (4.91)
Leverage (t-1) .14 -.01 .09 .18*
(.82) (-.17) (1.18) (2.20)
Financial_resources -1.58 .24 -1.13 1.65
(-.66) (.25) (-1.35) (.52)
Constant -.56 -.15** -.48** -.31
(-.53) (-3.44) (-9.42) (-.32)
Number of observations 196 909 819 286
R2 30.84% 14.16% 30.04% 25.34%
Fitness Test 4.15** 8.36** 17.37** 4.72**
Hausman Test 32.91** 18.79* 28.42** 42.31**
aStandardized regression coefficients are shown in the table. T-statistics in parentheses.
†p < .10
*p < .05
**p < .01
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management practices are effective for boosting profits in
the short-term but are detrimental in the medium-term (one
period ahead), which is may be precisely one of the reasons
why managers develop CSR activities. Finally, turning our
attention to the rest of variables, we find that financial per-
formance increases with financial resources.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
In this paper, we investigate the relationship between CSR
and earnings management practices. We explore the thesis
that managers manipulate earnings in order to obtain private
benefits, and through these practices they damage the inter-
ests of stakeholders. As stakeholders exert pressure on firm
decisions, managers may internalize the negative impact of
their actions and work to compensate these constituencies
through CSR activities. Predictably, by colluding with non-
shareholder stakeholders, a manager is able to reduce the
likelihood of earnings management practices being scruti-
nized by the firm’s stakeholders. Therefore, we hypothesize
a positive association between earnings management prac-
tices and CSR activities.
To demonstrate our theoretical contention, we make use
of an international database provided by the Sustainable
Investment Research International Company (SiRi). SiRi
scrutinizes firms with respect to their practices toward
employees, communities, suppliers, customers, environ-
ment, and corporate governance. We complement these data
on corporate responsibility with financial data from the
TABLE 3C
Robustness Tests for Income Smoothing & Stakeholder Effectsa
Table 3C shows the results of estimating CSR in terms of earnings management and other control variables defined in the
text. In columns 1 and 2, we define the variable for earnings management by a measure of income smoothing computed as
the correlation between changes in accruals and changes in cash flow. In column 3 the dependent variable is the score for
customer satisfaction, while the score for employees’ satisfaction is the dependent variable in column 4.
Dependent variable CSR CSR Customers Employees
CFP (t-1) .06 .05 .12* .04
(1.40) (1.34) (2.14) (1.06)
Income_smoothing .99* .95*
(1.86) (1.80)
Earnings_management 5.48** 4.69* 3.81*
(2.45) (1.98) (2.23)
R&D_intensity 1.70 1.83 -.76 1.16
(1.48) (1.59) (-.50) (1.09)
Ownership_concentration -.00 -.05 -.68 .06
(-.01) (-.14) (-1.59) (.21)
Institutional_ownership .04 .03 .17* -.18**
(.55) (.54) (1.86) (-3.17)
Risk (t-1) 1.63* 1.62* -1.24 .99
(2.06) (2.05) (-1.33) (1.49)
Size 6.56** 7.30** 3.80† -.56
(3.76) (4.15) (1.66) (-.32)
Leverage (t-1) .45 .48 1.08 1.83†
(.39) (.42) (.73) (1.74)
Financial_resources -14.93 -13.70 -37.55* -26.90*
(-1.16) (-1.07) (-2.07) (-2.13)
Constant -2.01** -1.91** -2.64** -2.41**
(-3.48) (-3.32) (-2.77) (-3.89)
Number of observations 873 873 1105 1105
R2 5.59% 6.78% 2.90% 3.62%
Fitness Test 3.12** 3.44** 1.78* 21.93**
Hausman Test 21.51** 23.95** 22.49** 29.08**
aStandardized regression coefficients are shown in the table. T-statistics in parentheses.
†p < .10
*p < .05
**p < .01
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COMPUSTAT Global Vantage database for the years 2000
through 2005. The final sample is an incomplete panel data of
593 companies from 26 countries.
The empirical results conform to our theoretical conten-
tion. In particular, we find a positive impact of earnings
management practices on CSR which is particularly clear in
those situations where the literature shows that managerial
entrenchment is more likely. We explain such a result by the
fact that managers who indulge in earnings management
practices have two reasons to satisfy stakeholders’ interests.
First, there is a pre-emptive reason–managers anticipate that
stakeholder activism, as a result of earnings manipulation,
may damage their position in the firm. A good way of avoid-
ing such activism is to satisfy stakeholders’ interests. Second,
an entrenchment reason–managers tend to collude with
other stakeholders as a hedging strategy against disciplinary
initiatives from shareholders affected detrimentally by these
earnings management practices.
The second result is that the connection between earnings
management and CSR is robust to the inclusion of variables
like financial performance. Our empirical evidence shows
that the linkage between earnings management and CSR is
not explained by the effect that these practices could have on
a firm’s CFP. A firm’s CSR can be increased, not only by
inflated financial results, but also by the set of pre-emptive
and entrenchment initiatives aimed at satisfying stakehold-
ers’ interests. In addition, we conduct a set of robustness
checks and the results hold for different specifications, dif-
TABLE 4
Moderating Effect of Earnings Management on Corporate Financial Performance (CFP) and Corporate Social
Responsibility (CSR) Relationshipa
Table 4 shows the results of estimating CFP in terms of CSR as well as the variable for earnings management and other
control variables defined in the text.
Dependent Variable CFP CFP CFP
CSR (t-1) .05**
(2.76)
Earnings_management .46**
(3.17)
Earnings_management (t-1) -.27† -.03*
(-1.72) (-2.78)
DEarnings_management*CSR (t-1) -.04**
(-3.34)
R&D_intensity -.22 -.01 .18
(-.43) (-.01) (1.05)
Ownership_concentration -.08 -.01 -.01
(-.51) (-.04) (-.05)
Institutional_ownership -.05† -.05 .01*
(-1.62) (-1.52) (2.05)
Risk (t-1) -.13 -.50 .23**
(-.50) (-1.47) (5.29)
Size 2.28** 7.54** .22†
(3.51) (9.27) (1.10)
Leverage (t-1) 1.63** 1.10** -.03
(3.87) (2.31) (-.83)
Financial_resources 85.37** 122.17** 25.63**
(48.88) (24.89) (20.89)
Constant 2.54** 3.14** .52**
(17.65) (16.13) (15.65)
Number of observations 1105 1105 743
R2 65.86% 42.39% 64.55%
Fitness Test 304.84** 78.55** 46.51**
Hausman Test 127.74** 131.94** 303.48**
aStandardized regression coefficients are shown in the table. T-statistics in parentheses.
†p < .10
*p < .05
**p < .01
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ferent measures of earnings manipulation (i.e., income
smoothing), as well as for particular types of stakeholders
(i.e., workers and customers). Also, consistent with our
theory, the results are more significant in those politically-
sensitive sectors (i.e., regulated industries) and in common
law legal-origin countries, where we expect stakeholder
activism to be more pronounced.
A final finding, which is also consistent with this perverse
use of CSR, is that generous social concessions, defrayed
through accounting manipulation, reduce the positive effect
of CSR on financial performance, while reinforcing the nega-
tive impact of earnings managements on CFP.
Limitations, Alternative Explanations and
Directions for Future Research
Some limitations in our study should be acknowledged and
could be helpful to guide future research. Although we use
a unique database with a number of strengths such as its
international scope, we must recognize some weakness in
our empirical application. One such limitation is related to
the reduced number of years on which our findings are
based. Future work should attempt to expand the sample to
include more years, allowing the employment of temporal
lags and/or leads in the estimations – particularly in those
estimations that are based on measures of income-
smoothing, which require computing correlation between
variables along time. Additionally, richer panel data would
allow the examination of long-term aspects of the connec-
tion between earnings management, CSR, and performance.
Second, although the expected direction of causality is
from earnings management to CSR, we cannot exclude the
reverse relationship, hence we need to look carefully at
endogeneity issues. Engaging in socially responsible activi-
ties not only enhances corporate reputation, but also reduces
activism and vigilance from stakeholder groups (Zahra et al.,
2005). Therefore, an executive who has gained support from
different stakeholders may in turn engage in earnings man-
agement. Note that our basic argument can also explain such
an apparent reverse causality – managers, who are set ini-
tially on earnings manipulation, anticipate the consequences
of such actions on stakeholder interests and, therefore,
satisfy them ex-ante some periods before the implementa-
tion of earnings management due to the inertia in CSR prac-
tices and the difficulties in changing them. We provide some
evidence in such direction. However, future research with a
long time series could explore, in greater depth, the endo-
geneity that may emerge from reverse causality between
earnings management and CSR by using GMM estimation
techniques; these techniques are quite demanding in terms
of the required number of periods.
Third, our research model does not consider the possibil-
ity that other types of variables could intervene in the rela-
tionship between earnings management, CSR, and financial
performance. For example, it could be possible for owner-
ship structure, corporate governance, and institutional
factors to moderate the causal links among our model vari-
ables; we argue that earnings management is related to
entrenchment practices like the implementation of CSR
policies. Remarkably, the efficacy of such entrenchment
practices in the face of external corporate governance mecha-
nisms is contingent upon internal corporate governance
mechanisms such as ownership structures, boards of direc-
tors, and board subcommittees (Sundaramurthy, 2000).
Thus, we could expect that such internal corporate gover-
nance mechanisms, as well as the institutional factors that
define the balance between internal and external corporate
governance mechanisms, will have a clear impact on the
associations between earnings management, CSR, and finan-
cial performance. Additionally, when examining the role of
corporate governance, researchers could consider differ-
ences across countries, because previous research has sug-
gested that managerial cultures (Davis, Schoorman and
Donaldson, 1997) and investor protection (Leuz et al., 2003)
vary across institutional settings. We have made progress in
this direction by comparing the relationship between earn-
ings management and CSR in Anglo-Saxon and non-Anglo-
Saxon countries. The results indicate that in the former
group of countries the effect is more intense, thereby sug-
gesting a positive moderating effect of investor protection,
on the relationship between earnings management and CSR.
However, the study of these institutional aspects to a deeper
level calls for richer data.
Finally, alternative theoretical arguments may compete
with our entrenchment hypothesis. Although agency theory
is widely applied to investigation of corporate governance
issues, stewardship theory offers an alternative perspective.
In describing the underpinnings of stewardship theory,
Davis et al. (1997) asserts that a steward will engage in pro-
organizational, collectivist behaviors, gaining more satisfac-
tion from serving the group than from serving himself.
Therefore, the positive relationship between earnings man-
agement and CSR could be explained by using the steward-
ship theory point of view. To benefit all stakeholders, the
manager – the steward – influences reported earnings.
However, this alternative theory predicts a positive moder-
ating role of CSR in the connection from earnings manage-
ment to CFP, which is not consistent with our findings.
Despite these limitations, we believe that our paper sheds
new light on how a firm’s CSR may be used as an inte-
gral part of an entrenchment strategy by executives who
manipulate earnings. We hope that these considerations may
help to put the dark-side aspects of CSR on the research
agendas of scholars.
Policy Implications
The recognition of the increasing importance of CSR has
fueled a debate of whether corporations under-invest in
social activities. Sometimes in this debate, public authorities
are accused of not providing enough stimuli to firms to
improve CSR. The conclusions derived from this study are
important when influencing public policies on this issue.
Public authorities should not take for granted that firms with
extensive CSR behave fairly. Our results show that these
firms may very likely be involved in earnings management
practices and that, more importantly, the combination of
earnings management and CSR practices causes deteriora-
tion in a firm’s financial performance. Thus, policies aiming
at promoting socially responsible practices, like tax reduc-
tions, instead of motivating the desired behavior, may
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provide managers with additional incentives to over-invest
in (inefficient) CSR. Such a scenario could allow malprac-
tices like earnings management to occur or even stimulate
them. A second measure is the harmonization of the finan-
cial reporting process (exemplified by the promulgation of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in US, or the International Financial
Reporting Standards in European countries) as well as the
harmonization of CSR measurement systems across coun-
tries. These initiatives should hinder discretionary choices
of management on social issues aimed at manipulating
earnings. Another measure is to regulate social issues in
order to avoid over-investment in socially responsible
actions. Undoubtedly, mandatory accounting practices that
reflect these issues on the balance sheet may be a first step in
this direction. In addition to these initiatives, public authori-
ties may regulate firms’ corporate governance in order to
create a board subcommittee responsible for monitoring
social investments.
Managerial Implications
The implications for managers are quite straightforward
given the negative consequences on financial performance
of combining accounting manipulation with improvements
in CSR to obtain stakeholder support. Our findings,
however, do not advise managers to avoid investments in
social activities, because we find that relationships with key
stakeholders have a direct, positive impact on financial per-
formance. Therefore, while strategic CSR (i.e., social prac-
tices that a company develops in order to expand the set of
value-creating relationships with its stakeholders) impacts
positively on financial performance, discretionary CSR,
reflected in social practices that do not affect the bottom line,
have a negative payoff. This negative effect is explained by
the fact that the costs of improving CSR exceed any accruing
benefits (see McWilliams et al., 2006). The self-serving behav-
ior that a manager adopts, in order to obtain support from
corporate stakeholders after managing earnings, belongs to
this discretionary approach and, therefore, explains the dark
side of CSR found in our study.
The main prescription for managers, if these results are
refined and extended, is to avoid using concessions to stake-
holders as a device to entrench themselves. The strategy of
projecting a socially-friendly image as a front to disguise
earnings management practices, although reducing the like-
lihood of being fired in the short-term given the support
from stakeholders, cannot be sustained along time due to the
damages on financial performance.
Conclusion
The vast amount of resources that organizations devote to
CSR activities prompts the need for a better understanding
of the motivations behind socially responsible behavior as
well as its implications on financial performance. This study
highlights the relevance of distinguishing whether invest-
ments in CSR affect the firms’ bottom line or, alternatively, is
part of a managerial entrenchment strategy to gain support
from stakeholders after having employed practices damag-
ing to shareholders’ interests like earnings management. We
posit that abrupt improvements in a firm’s CSR may be
connected to value-destroying practices like earnings man-
agement and that these could even reinforce the negative
impact of such practices on a firm’s returns. The main aim of
this paper is to provide such a warning signal.
ENDNOTES
1. In particular, we introduce the variable of ROA as an explana-
tory variable of the predicted accruals. By including ROA in
estimations, we eliminate the effect of performance from the
unpredicted accruals (see Appendix 1 for more details).
2. Visit www.centreinfo.ch/doc/doc_site/SP-Novartis-06.pdf for
an example of a detailed profile, and visit www.ais.com.es/
ingles/productos/derivados.htm#1 for more information on
SiRi ProTM.
3. The central argument draws on a stream of stakeholder theory
called slack resources hypothesis (Waddock and Graves, 1997)
that connects greater CFP to a surplus of resources that gives
firms the necessary financial wherewithal to attend to social
issues (McGuire, Sundgren and Schneeweis, 1988; Kraft and
Hage, 1990; McGuire, Sundgren and Branch, 1990; Preston,
Sapienza and Millar, 1991).
4. In order to control for temporal, sectoral, and country effects in
fixed-effect estimation, we detract from each dependent variable
its mean value for the corresponding year, sector, and country.
5. Our sample is composed of 26 different nations, with the US
(31.26 per cent), UK (15.37 per cent), Japan (8.51 per cent), France
(7.75 per cent), Switzerland (7.37 per cent), Germany (5.97 per
cent), Netherlands (4.96 per cent), Sweden (3.68 per cent), Italy
(2.92 per cent), and Canada (1.91 per cent) being most
represented.
6. For the sake of consistency with the estimations, we show the
correlations of differences in the variables. Note that in fixed-
effect estimations, variables are taken as differences between
periods.
7. We follow La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny
(1998) and separate the countries by those with French, German,
Scandinavian, and Anglo-Saxon-legal origin. Australia, Canada,
Hong Kong, Ireland, Singapore, Thailand, UK, and US also fall
within the latter category
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The authors wish to thank Carlos Bendito, Managing Direc-
tor of Analistas Internacionales en Sostenibilidad (AIS™) – a
sustainable Investment Research International Company
partner firm based in Spain – for their helpful comments and
access to the SiRi Pro™ database. We would also like to
thank the editor and the referees, as well as participants at
the Foro de Finanzas (Castellón de la Plana, 2006), and the
seminar participants at Universitat Autònoma of Barcelona
for their useful comments on earlier drafts of this paper. We
also acknowledge the financial support of the Comunidad
de Madrid (Grant # s-0505/tic/000230) and the Ministerio
de Educación y Ciencia (Grant #SEC2003-017311, grant
#SEC003-04770, and grant # SEJ2006-09401). The usual dis-
claimers apply.
REFERENCES
Aupperle, K., Carroll, A. and Hatfield, J. (1985) An empirical exami-
nation of the relationship between corporate social responsibility
and profitability, Academy of Management Journal, 28: 446–63.
174 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
Volume 16 Number 3 May 2008 © 2008 The Authors
Journal compilation © 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
Baber W., Fairfield P. and Haggard, J. (1991) The Effect of concern
about reported income on discretionary spending decision: The
case of research and development, The Accounting Review, 66:
818–29.
Bansal, P. (2005) Evolving sustainably: A longitudinal study of cor-
porate sustainable development, Strategic Management Journal,
26: 197–218.
Baron, D. P. (2001) Private politics, corporate social responsibility,
and integrated strategy, Journal of Economics and Management
Strategy, 10: 7–45.
Berman, S., Wicks, A., Kotha, S. and Jones, T. (1999) Does stake-
holder orientation matter? The relationship between stakeholder
management models and firm financial performance, Academy of
Management Journal, 42: 488–506.
Carlson, S. J. and Bathala, C. T. (1997) Ownership differences and
firms’ income smoothing behavior, Journal of Business Finance &
Accounting, 24(2): 179–96.
Carroll, A. B. (1979) A three-dimensional conceptual model of cor-
porate social performance, Academy of Management Review, 4:
497–505.
Castelo, M. and Lima, L. (2006) Corporate social responsibility and
resource-based perspectives, Journal of Business Ethics, 69: 111–
32.
Cespa, G. and Cestone, G. (2007) Corporate social responsibility
and managerial entrenchment, Journal of Economics and Manage-
ment Strategy, 16(3): 741–71.
Clarkson, M. (1994) A Risk Based Model of Stakeholder Theory.
Proceedings of the Second Toronto Conference on Stakeholder
Theory, Centre for Corporate Social Performance and Ethics,
University of Toronto. Toronto.
Clinch, G. (1991) Employee compensation and firms’ research and
development activity, Journal of Accounting Research, 29: 59–78.
D’Souza, J., Jacob, J. and Ramesh, K. (2000) The use of accounting
flexibility to reduce labor renegotiation costs and manage earn-
ings, Journal of Accounting and Economics, 30: 187–208.
Davidson III, W. N., Jiraporn, P., Kim, Y. S. and Nemec, C. (2004)
Earnings management following duality-creating successions:
Ethnostatistics, impression management, and agency theory,
Academy of Management Journal, 47: 267–75.
Davis J., Schoorman, F. D. and Donaldson, L. (1997) Toward a
stewardship theory of management, Academy of Management
Review, 22: 20–47.
De Miguel, A., Pindado, J. and De la Torre, C. (2004) Ownership
structure and firm value: New evidence from Spain, Strategic
Management Journal, 25: 1119–207.
DeAngelo, L. (1988). Managerial competition, information costs
and corporate governance: The use of accounting performance
measures in proxy contests, Journal of Accounting and Economics,
10: 3–36.
Dechow, P. and Sloan, R. G. (1991) Executive incentive and the
horizon problem: An empirical investigation, Journal of Account-
ing and Economics, 14:, 51–89.
Dechow, P., Sloan, R. and Sweeney, A. (1995) Detecting earnings
management, The Accounting Review, 70: 193–225.
Dechow, P. and Sweeney, A. (1996) Causes and consequences
of earnings manipulation: An analysis of firms subject to enforce-
ment actions by the SEC, Contemporary Accounting Research, 13:
1–36.
DeFond, M. L. and Jiambalvo, J. (1994) Debt Covenant violation
and manipulation of accruals, Journal of Accounting and Econom-
ics, 17: 145–76.
Donaldson, T. L. and Preston, L. E. (1995) The stakeholder theory of
the corporation: Concepts, evidence, and implications, Academy
of Management Review, 20: 65–91.
DuCharme, L. L., Malatesta, P. H. and Sefcik, S. E. (2004) Earnings
management, stock issues, and shareholder lawsuits, Journal of
Financial Economics, 71: 27–49.
Feddersen, T. and Gilligan, T. (2001) Saints and markets: Activists
and the supply of credence goods, Journal of Economics and Man-
agement Strategy, 10: 149–71.
Fombrun C, Gardberg N. and Barnett M. (2000) Opportunity plat-
forms and safety nets: Corporate citizenship and reputational
risk. Business and Society Review, 105: 85–106.
Freeman, E. (1984) Strategic Management: A Stakeholder Approach,
Pitman, Boston, MA.
Friedman, M. (1970) The social responsibility of business is to
increase its profits, New York Times Magazine, 13: 32–3.
Fudenberg, K. and Tirole, J. (1995) A theory of income and divi-
dend smoothing based on incumbency rents, Journal of Political
Economy, 103: 75–93.
Han, J. and Wang, S. (1998) Political costs and earnings manage-
ment of oil companies during the 1990 Persian Gulf crisis, The
Accounting Review, 73: 103–17.
Healy, P.M. and Wahlen, J. M. (1999) A review of the earnings
management literature and its implications for standard setting,
Accounting Horizons, 13: 365–83.
Hill, C. W. and Jones, T. M. (1992) Stakeholder-agency theory,
Journal of Management Studies, 29: 131–54.
Hillman, A. J. and Keim, G. D. (2001) Shareholder value, stake-
holder management, and social issues: What’s the bottom line?
Strategic Management Journal, 22: 125–39.
Holthausen, R. W., Larcker, D. F. and Sloan, R. G. (1995) Annual
bonus schemes and the manipulation of earnings, Journal of
Accounting and Economics, 19: 29–74.
Jensen, M. C. (2001) Value maximization, stakeholder theory, and
the corporate objective function, Journal of Applied Corporate
Finance, 14:, 8–21.
John, A. and Klein, J. (2003) The boycott puzzle: Consumer moti-
vations for purchase sacrifice, Management Science, 49: 1196–209.
Jones, T. M. (1995) Instrumental stakeholder theory: A synthesis of
ethics and economics, Academy of Management Review, 20: 404–
37.
Jones, J. (1991) Earnings management during import relief investi-
gations, Journal of Accounting Research, 29: 193–228.
Kang, S. H. and Sivaramakrishnan, K. (1995) Issues in testing earn-
ings management and an instrumental variable approach, Journal
of Accounting Research, 33: 355–67.
Kothari, S. P., Leone, A. J. and Wasley, C. E. (2005) Performance
matched discretionary accrual measures, Journal of Accounting
and Economics, 39: 163–97.
Kraft, K. and Hage, J. (1990) Strategy, social responsibility and
implementation, Journal of Business Ethics, 9: 11–19.
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R.
(1998), Law and finance, Journal of Political Economy 106: 1113–
55.
Leuz, C., Nanda, D. and Wysocki, P. (2003) Earnings management
and investors protection: An international comparison, Journal of
Financial Economics, 69: 505–27.
Luoma, P. and Goodstein, J. (1999) Stakeholders and corporate
boards: Institutional influences on board composition and struc-
ture, Academy of Management Journal, 42: 553–63.
McGuire, J. B., Sundgren, A. and Branch, B. (1990) Perceptions of
firm quality: A cause or result of firm performance, Journal of
Management, 16: 167–80.
McGuire, J. B., Sundgren, A. and Schneeweis, T. (1988) Corporate
social responsibility and firm financial performance, Academy of
Management Journal, 31: 854–72.
McWilliams, A., Siegel, D. S. and Wright, P. M. (2006) Corporate
social responsibility: Strategic implications, Journal of Manage-
ment Studies, 43: 1–18.
Neubaum, D. O. and Zahra, S. A. (2006) Institutional ownership
and corporate social performance: The moderating effects of
investment horizon, activism, and coordination, Journal of Man-
agement, 32: 108–31.
ARE SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE MANAGERS REALLY ETHICAL? 175
Volume 16 Number 3 May 2008© 2008 The Authors
Journal compilation © 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
Orlitzky, M., Schmidt, F. L. and Rynes, S. L. (2003) Corporate social
and financial performance: A meta-analysis, Organization Studies,
24,:403–41.
Pagano, M. and Volpin, P. (2005) Managers, workers, and corporate
control, The Journal of Finance, 60: 841–68.
Preston, L. and O’Bannon, D. (1997) The Corporate social-financial
performance relationship. A typology and analysis, Business and
Society, 36: 419–29.
Preston, L., Sapienza, H. and Millar, R. (1991) Stakeholders, stock-
holders, managers: Who gain what from corporate governance?
In: A. Etzioni and P. Lawrence (Eds.), Socio-economics: Toward a
New Synthesis, 149–66. ME Sharpe, Armonk, London.
Ronen, J. and Sadan, S. (1981) Smoothing Income Numbers: Objectives,
Means, and Implications. Addison-Wesley, Reading, MA.
Rowley, T. (1997) Moving beyond dyadic ties: A network theory of
stakeholder influence, Academy of Management Review, 22: 887–
910.
Rowley, T. and Berman, S. (2000) A brand new brand of corporate
social performance, Business and Society, 39: 397–418.
Spagnolo, G. (2005) Managerial incentives and collusive behavior,
European Economic Review, 49: 1501–23
Sundaramurthy, C. (2000) Antitakeover provisions and share-
holder value implications: A review and a contingency frame-
work, Journal of Management, 26(5): 1005–30.
Tirole, J. (2001), Corporate governance, Econometrica, 69: 1–35.
Waddock, S. A. and Graves, S. B. (1997) The corporate social
performance-financial performance link, Strategic Management
Journal, 18: 303–19.
Watts, R. L. and Zimmerman, J. L. (1978) Towards a positive theory
of the determination of accounting standards, The Accounting
Review, 53: 112–34.
Williamson, O. E. (1993) Calculativeness, trust, and economic orga-
nization, Journal of Law and Economics, 36: 453–86.
Yeo, G. H. H., Tan, P. M. S., Ho, K. W. and Chen, S. (2002) Corporate
ownership structure and the informativeness of earnings, Journal
of Business Finance & Accounting, 29: 1023–46.
Zahra, S. A., Priem, R. L. and Rasheed, A.A. (2005) The antecedents
and consequences of top management fraud, Journal of Manage-
ment, 31: 803–28.
Dr. Diego Prior is Professor of Accounting in the Depart-
ment of Business Administration at the Universitat
Autònoma de Barcelona. He holds a Ph.D. in Business
Administration from Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona.
His research interests are efficiency and productivity analy-
sis, financial accounting, and management in the public
sector. He has published in European Economic Review,
Journal of Banking and Finance, European Journal of Operational
Research, and Applied Economics.
Dr. Jordi Surroca is an Associate Professor of Management
in the Department of Business Administration at the Univer-
sidad Carlos III de Madrid. He holds a Ph.D. in Business
Administration from Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona.
His research interests are stakeholder management, firm
strategy, innovation, and corporate governance. He has pub-
lished in Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, Corporate
Governance: An International Review, European Journal of
Operational Research, and Journal of Business Ethics.
Dr. Josep A. Tribó is anAssociate Professor of Finance in the
Department of Business Administration at the Universidad
Carlos III de Madrid. He has a Ph.D. in Economic Analysis
from the Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. His research
interests are corporate finance, corporate social responsibil-
ity, and the financing of R&D. His work has been published
in journals such as Journal of Business Finance and Accounting,
Corporate Governance: An International Review, Omega, Applied
Economics, International Journal of Production Economics, and
Journal of Business Ethics.
APPENDIX 1
Measurement of Earnings Management
The estimation of earnings management is made through
discretionary accruals (DA). These are computed by detract-
ing the expected or non-discretionary accruals (NDA) from
the total accruals (TA). We use the Kothari et al. (2005) model
to estimate DA and NDA. This model departs from the modi-
fied Jones model introduced by Dechow et al. (1995), and
incorporates a non-deflated constant term as well as a term
that captures performance (ROA). In particular, in the modi-
fied Jones model total accruals are estimated in terms of
changes in sales minus receivables (D(Sales-Receivables))
and property, plant, and equipment (PPE). All these vari-
ables including the constant are deflated by lagged total
assets (At-1). We estimate each year cross-sectionally and by
considering a 1-digit SIC code. Moreover, as we make use of
an international database, it is normal to find large differ-
ences in the level of earnings management across countries
(Leuz, Nanda, and Wysocki, 2003). Unfortunately, we do not
have enough observations for each country and we cannot
separate the analysis country by country. We employ a solu-
tion that includes in its specifications a set of country
dummy variables. This estimation strategy has been used in
several papers (Kang and Sivaramakrishnan, 1995; Han and
Wang, 1998). Due to all these reasons, and considering the
number of sectors (10) and countries (26) in our data, we
propose the following specification for estimating NDA for
firm i in sector s and year t:
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Country sets are dichotomous variables that capture
country effects. The expected portion of total accruals, the
non-discretional component, is calculated using the regres-
sion coefficients from equation [A.1]:
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From the non-discretionary accruals, NDA, we compute
the discretionary accruals, DA, as follows:
DA
Accruals
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In this model, the change in sales minus receivables is
used to control for firm growth since working capital is
closely related to sales, while PPE is used to control for
depreciation expenses contained in accruals. Finally, the vari-
able of ROA detracts the effect of performance in explaining
differences in accruals. As a result, NDA are the expected
accruals given the firm’s growth, performance and fixed
assets, while DA represents the unexpected accruals, which
is our proxy for Earnings_management.
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